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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND HOFFMAN PLASTIC:
PANDORA’S UNDOCUMENTED BOX
Remember, remember always that all of us, and you and I especially, are
descended from immigrants and revolutionists.
1

—President Franklin D. Roosevelt

We need the National Guard to clean up our cities and round them up. . . .
They have no problem slitting your throat and taking your money or
selling drugs to your kids or raping your daughter and they are evil people.
2

—Chris Simcox

INTRODUCTION
The twenty-first century immigrant in America exists amidst dreams and
nightmares. The twentieth century immigrant provided both the foundation
and versatility that made America one of the most diverse, democratic, and
dynamic nations on the planet by fulfilling the “American Dream.”3 In the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, xenophobia ran wild
across the nation. The immigrant became a dangerous stranger, full of
criminal and terroristic intent,4 as well as an economic pillager assaulting our
economy by stealing jobs.5 There was an urgent call to resolve America’s
immigration problems via militarized borders and more stringent standards for
legal entry into the country, thus making the twenty-first century a nightmare

1. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the U.S., Remarks to the Daughters of the
American Revolution (Apr. 21, 1938), reprinted in THE AMERICAN READER 474 (Diane Ravitch
ed., rev. 2d ed. 2000).
2. David Holthouse, Arizona Showdown: High-powered Firearms, Militia Maneuvers and
Racism at the Minuteman Project, S. POVERTY L. CTR. INTELL. REP., Summer 2005, available at
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2005/summer/arizo
na-showdown (quoting Chris Simcox, co-founder of the Minuteman Project and president of the
Minuteman Civil Defense Corps, 2005).
3. See Everett Carll Ladd, Op-Ed., Don’t Discount the Successes of the American Melting
Pot, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 4, 1995, at 19.
4. See Steven W. Bender, Sight, Sound, and Stereotype: The War on Terrorism and Its
Consequences for Latinas/os, 81 OR. L. REV. 1153, 1154 (2002) (“[U]ndocumented aliens are
now seen as a national security threat, as would-be terrorists . . . .”).
5. See Adam L. Lounsbury, Comment, A Nationalist Critique of Local Laws Purporting to
Regulate the Hiring of Undocumented Workers, 71 ALB. L. REV. 415, 416 (2008).
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for American immigrants.6 Inside the border, the new battlefront is in the U.S.
economy, where there is a staggering number of undocumented workers in the
workforce.7All of these things converge into the present-day situation: There
exist migrants responding to black-market job opportunities,8 employers
attempting to cut costs by hiring undocumented workers at low wages and with
few rights,9 and media-savvy politicians assuring the public that with each new
statute there will be progress toward curbing illegal immigration.10
Immigration provides a policy paradox. The unspoken tension is that
while the United States desperately needs secured borders, undocumented
immigrants have been powering the U.S. economy with tacit approval for over
fifty years.11 In fact, many present undocumented immigrants contribute
actively to our economy, and yet, they receive only marginal returns on their
labor contributions to our nation.12 There has been a search amongst Congress
and the courts for a way to enforce immigration laws at workplaces, rather than
at borders, by shifting the burden of enforcing documentation for lawful
employment onto employers.13 Voices of concern from both the Court and
Capitol Hill have warned that until both labor and immigration laws are in
accordance with each other, there will remain a “perverse” incentive to
encourage further illegal immigration.14

6. Kevin R. Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants: Collateral Damage Comes
Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 852, 857–58 (2003). Professor Johnson acknowledges that the
militarization of the border predated the events of September 11. Id. at 852–53.
7. See STEVEN A. CAMAROTA & KAREN JENSENIUS, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES,
BACKGROUNDER: A SHIFTING TIDE: RECENT TRENDS IN THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT POPULATION
1–2 (2009), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2009/shiftingtide.pdf (finding an estimated
10.8 million illegal immigrants in the United States in 2009 and noting that the illegal immigrant
population reflects the unemployment rate among that population).
8. See Maria Elena Bickerton, Note, Prospects for a Bilateral Immigration Agreement with
Mexico: Lessons from the Bracero Program, 79 TEX. L. REV. 895, 914–15 (2001).
9. Cf. id. at 916 (noting the low wages paid and advocating for legal status for migrants so
that the U.S. government might protect their rights).
10. Cf. Cecelia M. Espenoza, Relief for Undocumented Students: The Dream Act, 56 FED.
LAW., July 2009, at 44, 44 (detailing the political grandstanding surrounding the Development,
Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act of 2009, S. 729, 111th Cong. (2009)).
11. See Bickerton, supra note 8, at 907.
12. Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal,
and Without Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 2–6 (2006) (finding that empirical
studies prove that undocumented workers contribute more into the economy than what they cost
to support via social services).
13. See, e.g., Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359–94 (1986) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006)); H.R. REP. NO. 99-682(I), at
45–46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5649–50.
14. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 155–56 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t Homeland Sec., Prepared Remarks on Immigration
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Despite legislative action, there remains a growing black market for
undocumented labor, which creates both an illegal and exploited labor class.15
This labor exploitation takes the most grotesque forms, including not paying
workers for their toils,16 forcing employees to work in ultra hazardous
conditions with little training,17 and threatening injured workers with
deportation should they file a workers’ compensation claim.18 In 2002, during
the midst of this crisis, Hoffman Plastic was decided by the Supreme Court,
establishing that immigration policies supersede labor policies in regards to
unionization and labor rights19 and allowing the policy pendulum to swing
towards favoring black market incentives.20
In Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, the Supreme Court held that the
federal immigration laws supersede labor laws precluding the NLRB from
effectuating their back pay damages to an undocumented worker fired for
unionizing.21 In the years following the seminal Hoffman Plastic decision, the
holding has been used repeatedly as an affirmative defense in workers’
compensation cases involving undocumented workers.22 Each time, the
employer cites Hoffman Plastic as preemption to any recovery by an injured
undocumented plaintiff.23 The focus of this Comment is whether Hoffman
Plastic, which was decided in regard to unionization and back pay, is properly
applied when its rationale is utilized in litigation across the country by
employers to preclude workers’ compensation payments to injured
undocumented workers. This Comment examines the rationale and policy
from courts across the nation in determining whether Hoffman Plastic belongs
Reform at the Center for American Progress (Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
ynews/speeches/sp_1258123461050.shtm.
15. See Richard D. Vogel, Harder Times: Undocumented Workers and the U.S. Informal
Economy, MONTHLY REV., July/Aug. 2006, at 29, available at http://www.monthlyreview.org/
0706vogel.htm. But see Camarota & Jensenius, supra note 7, at 2 (concluding that although
illegal migration is currently decreasing, when the economy recovers and if enforcement is
reduced, the illegal population will begin to grow again).
16. See Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 701 (11th Cir. 1988) (examining claim for
back pay); Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462, 463 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (examining claim by
undocumented worker for unpaid labor).
17. Jason Schumann, Note, Working in the Shadows: Illegal Aliens’ Entitlement to State
Workers’ Compensation, 89 IOWA L. REV. 709, 712 (2004).
18. Id. at 713 n.21 (citing Jenalia Moreno, Undocumented and Endangered, HOUS. CHRON.,
Sept. 3, 2000, at Bus. 1).
19. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 151.
20. Id. at 154–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 151.
22. See, e.g., Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 2006);
Balbuena v. IDR Realty, LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1250 (N.Y. 2006); Amoah v. Mallah Mgmt.,
LLC, 866 N.Y.S.2d 797, 798–99 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
23. Madeira, 469 F.3d at 223; Balbuena, 845 N.E.2d at 1250; Amoah, 866 N.Y.S.2d at 798–
99.
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in workers’ compensation cases, when such an application has serious
consequences for workplace safety and state police power.
Part I of this Comment discusses the historical background of federal
immigration and labor statutes examined in the Hoffman Plastic decision. Part
II captures the case law and doctrinal precedent involving cases in which
illegal immigration and labor laws were at odds with immigration policies.
Part III explains the lasting effects of the Hoffman Plastic decision, including
the rationales of the majority and dissent, attempting to resolve the policy
crisis. Part IV describes how Hoffman Plastic has been used in workers’
compensation litigation and how state and federal courts across the country
have responded to its application. This Comment concludes by arguing that
the application of Hoffman Plastic in workers’ compensation cases is
misplaced and perversely incentivizes employers to both further violate
immigration laws by employing undocumented workers and ignore workplace
safety standards, endangering both legal residents and the undocumented
claimants.
I. BACKGROUND AND THE POLICY PATH TO HOFFMAN PLASTIC
A.

Immigration Legislation from 1790 to 2002
1.

From Open Borders to Ethnic Quotas: Years 1790 to 1952

America is a nation built by and for immigrants. The encouragement or
prohibition on immigration and certain types of immigrants has fluctuated with
history and foreign policy conflicts.24 The first immigration-related statute in
the United States was arguably the Naturalization Act of 1790, which required
immigrants meet the following standards to be eligible for citizenship: be a
“free white person,” of “good character,” residence in the United States for
over two years, and residence in any given state for at least one year.25 Then,
during the late 1800s, Congress enacted a series of statutes establishing limits
on entry of socially undesirable peoples, such as convicts, prostitutes, lunatics,
and paupers.26 Starting with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and
continuing to the Immigration Act of 1924, Congress began systematically
excluding targeted countries and ethnic groups from lawfully immigrating into
the United States.27 While the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 suspended the
24. See RONALD TAKAKI, A DIFFERENT MIRROR: A HISTORY OF MULTICULTURAL
AMERICA 7–12 (paperback ed. 1993).
25. Act of Mar. 20, 1790 (Naturalization Act of 1790), ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103–04 (repealed 1795).
26. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477, 477; Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat.
214, 214.
27. Act of May 6, 1882 (Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882), ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, 59 (repealed
1943) (excluding immigrants from China); Act of May 26, 1924 (Immigration Act of 1924), ch.
190, 43 Stat. 153, 167 (repealed 1952) (providing exceptions from quotas to certain nationalities).
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Chinese immigration of skilled and unskilled laborers and mining employees,28
the Immigration Act of 1924 conclusively outlawed all Asian immigration.29
The aftermath of World War I and the massive influx of immigration in the
early decades of the twentieth century pushed Congress into the immigration
quota system that continues to this day.30 The Immigration Act of 1924
established a two percent quota per country—provided a given country’s
citizens were not wholly barred from immigrating—meaning that each year, a
number totaling two percent of the existing U.S. population (i.e., the Irish
population) would be allowed to immigrate into the United States.31 The quota
did not effectively limit immigrants from countries which already had sizable
populations within the United States—thus allowing almost unchecked
immigration from Ireland, Britain, and Germany—but did restrict the Asiatic
Triangle and southern European countries, whose populations were smaller
(and tended to have communist sympathies).32 This tacit immigration regime
aimed at curbing anarchists33 and Asian immigration remained in place until
1952.34
2.

From 1952 to 1986: The Era of the Immigration and Nationality Acts

Immediately following the conclusion of World War II and during the
advent of the Cold War, Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA).35 The purpose of the INA was to codify and clarify the plethora of
federal statutes that regulated immigration but which lacked systematic and
unified framework.36 The INA retained a quota system held at roughly
154,000 immigrants per year for monitored countries, developed a preference
system for skilled workers and their families, and repealed the earlier statutes

28. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 § 1, 22 Stat. at 61.
29. See Immigration Act of 1924 § 26, 43 Stat. at 167.
30. James F. Smith, A Nation That Welcomes Immigrants? An Historical Examination of
United States Immigration Policy, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 227, 232 (1995).
31. Immigration Act of 1924 § 11(a), 43 Stat. at 159.
32. See id. at 155.
33. Cf. Keisha A. Gary, Note, Congressional Proposals to Revive Guilt by Association: An
Ineffective Plan to Stop Terrorism, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 227, 230 (1994) (describing timely
passage of immigration quotas following the assassination of President McKinley by anarchist
Leon Czolgosz).
34. CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THREE DECADES OF MASS IMMIGRATION: THE
LEGACY OF THE 1965 IMMIGRATION ACT (1995), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/1995/
back395.html.
35. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (amended
1965) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006)).
36. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365, at 27 (1952) (“[The Immigration and Nationality Act] represents
the first attempt to bring within one cohesive and comprehensive statute the various laws relating
to immigration, naturalization, and nationality.”).
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barring Asian immigration by allocating 100 visa slots to each Asian country.37
The INA lacked, however, provisions regarding labor. Thus, the INA did not
make it unlawful to employ an illegal alien, nor did it establish any penalties
for contributing to the black market of illegal labor.38 The INA is an example
of how immigration and economic interests do not always converge—while
streamlining immigration policy to tighten security measures out of Cold War
fears, the government, through the Bracero program, was actively encouraging
temporary immigration of non-citizens to satisfy agricultural workforce
needs.39 The INA did not subject Latin America to any quota or numerical
limitations.40
As the Civil Rights movement inspired the nation, legislators passed
amendments to the INA (INAA), which abolished the quota systems and
established new family- and skill-based standards in an attempt to equalize the
playing field for all potential immigrants.41 The standards took the form of
eight priority levels, ranging from offspring of citizens to refugees fleeing from
communism.42 With the immigration from Western Europe slowing and
abundant employment of undocumented workers in agriculture, manufacturing,
and other industries leftover from the Bracero program, the INAA was
violently silent on illegal immigration’s relationship with labor until 1986.43
3.

The Advent of Awareness: The Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA)

Between 1965 and 1985, there was a massive influx of immigrants—
predominantly from Latin American countries—and, due to misguided
policies, a correlated population of largely illegal and undocumented workers
across the country.44 For the first time in American history, there was a policy
shift toward using economic strategy to curb immigration. Congress effected
that shift by passing the IRCA, which focused almost exclusively on
37. See Immigration and Nationality Act, §§ 201(a), 202(c), 66 Stat. at 175, 178.
38. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892–93 (1984).
39. See Bickerton, supra note 8, at 896–97. The Bracero Program was a bilateral agreement
between the United States and Mexico established during World War II to provide a cheap and
steady labor force to U.S. industries affected by the absence of drafted workers. Id. Over five
million undocumented workers would participate in the Bracero Program in the following
decades. Id.
40. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(27), 66 Stat. at 169.
41. See Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, §§ 1–3, 79 Stat. 911, 911–13 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1557 (2006)).
42. Id. § 3, 79 Stat. at 912–14.
43. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 144–45 (2001) (noting
Congress’s failure to address the employment of illegal aliens in the INAA).
44. Cf. Bickerton, supra note 8, at 914–15 (noting the significant increase in Mexican
immigration in the 1970s and 1980s and the incentive for illegal immigrants to remain in the
United States).
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employers and the hiring of illegal labor.45 With the IRCA, Congress
attempted to “close the back door” on illegal immigration by attacking the
incentive to employ illegal workers without penalty—the rationale being that
reduced job opportunities would curb illegal immigration.46 The IRCA
established an impressive verification scheme where the Bureau of Citizenship
and Immigration Services would issue proper documentation to any alien
legally entitled to work and which the alien would then present to prospective
employers upon application for any job.47 To effectuate this policy, Congress
enacted both civil and criminal penalties for employers who either knowingly
violated the IRCA by hiring an alien without documentation or did not
terminate the employment of an alien upon gaining knowledge of the lack of
documentation.48 In a strange twist of legislative drafting, however, the IRCA
penalized any alien who provided false documentation to obtain employment,
but there was no penalty or discussion regarding a penalty for an alien simply
working without documentation.49
Therefore, the IRCA finally established proactive policies to encourage
employers to curb illegal immigration by prohibiting the hiring of aliens
lacking proper documentation.50 While not resolving all of the complexities of
illegal immigration, this was a significant shift away from arbitrary quotas and
into thoughtful policy and economic resolve. Despite this policy change,
illegal immigration—particularly from Latin America—flourished as
employers evaded penalties. From 1986 to 2005, the number of illegal
immigrants increased from approximately two million to ten million.51

45. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006)).
46. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682(I), at 46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5650; see
also Court E. Golumbic, Comment, Closing the Open Door: The Impact of the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Exclusion on the Legalization Program of the Immigration Control and
Reform Act of 1986, 15 YALE J. INT’L L. 162, 165 & n.11 (1990) (describing the growing
importance of employer sanctions to immigration policy as recognized by Congress and President
Reagan).
47. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. at 3361–63.
48. Id. § 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. at 3360, 3366–68.
49. Id. § 103(a)(6), 100 Stat. at 3380.
50. Id. § 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. at 3360.
51. JAMES R. EDWARDS, JR., CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, BACKGROUNDER: TWO
SIDES OF THE SAME COIN: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN ILLEGAL AND LEGAL IMMIGRATION 6–7
(2006), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2006/back106.pdf (estimating that the number of
undocumented migrants increased from 5 million in 1987, to potentially 10 million
undocumented migrants in 2005).
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Fences, Terrorists, and Refugees: Immigration Reform from 2002–
2009

Since the passage of the IRCA in 1986, there has not been much evolution
in policies regarding illegal immigration and labor from Latin America.
Several acts have passed, but their effects have been questionable. The
Immigration Act of 1990 increased resources for the border patrol and
established lottery system for immigration quantities.52 The Nicaraguan
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997 provided relief from
deportation from Latin American countries reeling from former Soviet bloc
control, such as Cuba and Nicaragua.53 Finally, the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 formalized deportation and
criminal penalties for illegal entry into the United States while again allocating
resources for the border patrol and border fencing.54 This last act did establish
a stronger policy on illegal aliens in the United States by creating streamlined
deportation procedures, but overall failed to address the economic reality of
labor and illegal aliens.55
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there was
an outcry for border security and a scathing eye was directed upon illegal
immigration.56 While legislation did pass for issuing driver’s licenses57 and
financing militarized borders,58 there has not been any significant alteration to
the INAA or the IRCA statutes.59 In fact, as Mexico’s economy began to
collapse in recent years from the inception of NAFTA and its losing battle
against agricultural subsidies, there existed a heightened economic incentive

52. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §§ 162, 541, 104 Stat. 4978, 5009, 5057
(codified in part at 8 U.S.C. § 1153).
53. Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-100,
§§ 201–203, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193–96 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006)).
54. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208,
§§ 101–102, 108, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-553–3009-555, 3009-557–3009-558 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1101).
55. See id. §§ 301–309, 110 Stat. at 3009-575–3009-627 (creating procedures for
deportation but omitting any mention of labor and illegal aliens).
56. JOHN TIRMAN, IMMIGRATION AND INSECURITY: POST-9/11 FEAR IN THE UNITED
STATES 1 (MIT, Ctr. for Int’l Studies, Audit of the Conventional Wisdom Ser. No. 06-09, 2006)
57. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, §§ 101, 201–202, 119 Stat. 231, 302, 311–15
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1), 49 U.S.C. § 30301 (2006)) (requiring states to check legality
of residency for applicants).
58. Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, §§ 1–2, 120 Stat. 2638, 2638 (codified
at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006)).
59. Cf. Maurice Hew, Jr., The Fence and the Wall (Mart) . . . Maginot Line Mentality, 39
CONN. L. REV. 1383, 1386–88 (2007) (noting the failure of President Bush to come through on
his promise of immigration reform).
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for illegal immigration.60 Despite the militarization of the border between the
United States and Mexico, there is an thriving and powerful business rooted in
illegal human trafficking from the deserts of Mexico across dangerous and
deserted areas of Arizona, Texas, and New Mexico.61 If, as Congress intended,
the back door closed in 1986, then from 1987 to 2009, the windows opened
and the debates raged onward towards massive deportation, guest visas, and
amnesty.62 Meanwhile, employers continuted operating as they did half a
century ago, profiting and accelerating the problem leading into the outcome in
Hoffman Plastic.
B.

The Labor Laws & Policies Concerning NLRA and Workers’
Compensation
1.

The NLRA and NLRB

Similar to the streamlining of immigration policy with the advent of the
INA in 1952, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in 1935 was an
attempt to streamline the pitfalls and problems associated with earlier labor
legislation such as the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933.63 In
the midst of the Great Depression, workers needed an agency that could
enforce workers’ and unions’ rights against employers.64
The only
governmental labor entity in this timeframe, the National Labor Board (NLB),
lacked enforcement authority,65 and in 1935, the Supreme Court invalidated
NIRA as a violation of the Commerce Clause.66 With unemployment soaring
and the economy tumbling, the NLRA was passed on July 5, 1935.67 It set
forth a number of changes, including the listing of unfair employment practices
to protect workers.68
The NLRA also established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
which had two overarching functions: first, to hold elections which in
employees could decide whether and how to unionize, free from employer
60. Marla Dickerson, Placing Blame for Mexico’s Ills, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 2006, at C1.
61. Alejandro Portes, The Fence to Nowhere, AM. PROSPECT, Oct. 2007, at 26, 27.
62. Cf. id. (arguing that border militarization has had the opposite effect its supporters
desired). For a classic text providing useful background on the scope of the immigration
problem, see LUIS ALBERTO URREA, THE DEVIL’S HIGHWAY (2004).
63. See MICHAEL C. HARPER ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 81–
82 (6th ed. 2007) (citing National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 151 (2006)); National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, declared
unconstitutional by A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
64. See id. at 80–81.
65. Id. at 81.
66. Id. at 82 (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 549–50).
67. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006)).
68. Id. § 8, 49 Stat. at 452–53 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158).
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oppression; and second, to enforce the NLRA.69 Penalties for violations could
take the form of reinstatement orders, back pay awards, cease-and-desist
orders, injunctions, and other remedies imposed on employers for violating
workers’ rights under the NLRA.70 While illegal aliens are limited in their
ability to recover workers’ compensation,71 other statutes still provide avenues
of recovery for illegal aliens. Both the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights act allow back pay recovery for rights
violations by employers, both of which currently remain beyond the scope of
Hoffman Plastic.72
Procedurally, the NLRB conducts a hearing on an alleged violation of the
NLRA and makes a ruling allowing or denying a penalty upon the employer
for the violation; both the remedy and burden vary with the alleged violation.73
These rulings are appealable to the local U.S. Court of Appeals.74 The
NLRA’s definitions of unfair labor practices went hand-in-hand with the
creation of the NLRB to enforce and protect workers’ rights.75 In the
aftermath of Hoffman Plastic, the concern remains the same: that employers
have carte blanche to hire illegal labor and—in direct contravention of the
NLRA—fire them for unionizing without any penalty.76 In effect, a slave-like
immigrant labor class is being sustained and oppressed.
2.

Workers’ Compensation: Foundation and Rationale

Workers’ compensation is a system of providing benefits to an employee
for occupational injuries.77 Usually—each state varies—the employee must

69. Id. §§ 3, 6, 9–10, 49 Stat. at 451–53 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 156, 159–61).
70. Thomas J. Walsh, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: How the Supreme Court
Eroded Labor Law and Workers Rights in the Name of Immigration Policy, 21 LAW & INEQ. 313,
318 (2003) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(c), 160(j) (2000)).
71. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151–52 (2002). Aliens’ rights
under workers’ compensation statutes are limited by the deference given to a state’s definition of
an employee. Cf. Gregory T. Presmanes & Seth Eisenberg, Hazardous Condition: The Status of
Illegal Immigrants and Their Entitlement to Workers’ Compensation Benefits, 43 TORT TRIAL &
INS. PRAC. L.J. 247, 254 (2008) (providing examples where states’ definitions of employees have
determined aliens’ compensation rights).
72. Walsh, supra note 70, at 318–19 & n.43 (citing Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700,
706 (11th Cir. 1988) (interpreting FLSA to allow undocumented workers the right to back pay)).
Title VII has not received as much judicial attention post-Hoffman Plastic, but at least one
commentator believes that it retains its utility. See, e.g., Robert I. Correales, Did Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc., Produce Disposable Workers?, 14 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 103, 147–50
(2003).
73. National Labor Relations Act § 10, 49 Stat. at 453–55 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 160).
74. Id. § 10(f), 49 Stat. at 455 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 160(f)).
75. Cf. HARPER ET AL., supra note 63, at 82–83.
76. Id.
77. Presmanes & Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 248.
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prove the injury occurred during the course of employment, at which point the
employer must provide medical care for the injured employee.78 The driving
force behind workers’ compensation is to reduce litigation in courts and
manage costs for employers by spreading the costs through the purchasing of
insurance to cover workers’ injuries.79
Prior to the modern workers’ compensation systems, there existed a long
and arduous road to resolving an injured worker’s claim.80 In principle,
workers had the ability to file a tort suit against another worker who, through
negligence, caused them to be injured.81 This abstract right was curtailed in
the 1842 case Farwell v. Boston & Worchester Railroad Corp., in which the
Massachusetts Supreme Court imported the English doctrine of fellow-servant
rule.82 Under that doctrine, a servant had no claim against the master
(employer) for injuries caused by another worker; rather, claims were limited
to incidences where the employer was the party at fault.83 Courts started to
limit the fellow-servant rule by allowing dramatic and influential claims on a
case by case basis.84 Despite doctrinal limits, the system was still saturated
with claims.85 The rationale holding the nineteenth century employee
compensation system together was that workers who took dangerous jobs
would be compensated accordingly and, therefore, assumed the risk of injury,
thereby freeing the employer from bearing any further costs.86 This concept
has returned in the wake of the Hoffman Plastic workers’ compensation cases
concerning illegal labor.87
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, injured workers pursued
recompense via tort—an inefficient and costly system for both sides, and a
system which tended to favor employers.88 Both employees and employers
found this system to be arbitrary in its results. Employees faced a difficult
choice in that if they tried to settle with the employer or insurance company

78. See id.
79. See Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial
Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 70–71 (1967).
80. Cf. id. at 53 (outlining the common law rules of tort applicable before the introduction of
the workers’ compensation system).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 55 (citing Farwell v. Bos. & Worchester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842)).
83. Id. at 53.
84. Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 79, at 59.
85. See id. (noting that the narrowing of the doctrine did not succeed in stopping industrial
accident litigation).
86. Id. at 55.
87. See Presmanes & Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 248 (questioning whether employers must
pay workers’ compensation benefits for injured illegal immigrants).
88. Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 79, at 53, 65–67.
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they faced a wait ranging anywhere from six months to six years,89 or if they
tried to litigate the matter, they faced an arsenal of defenses and much of any
recovery was typically absorbed by attorneys’ contingency fees.90 Employers
had the headache of unpredictable jury verdicts, courts costs, and haggling
Even the courts
with insurance companies regarding these claims.91
themselves found the flood of litigation and the character of claims
disheartening, as Chief Justice J.B. Winslow of Wisconsin stated:
[T]he results to life and limb and human happiness [are] so distressing that the
attempt to honestly administer cold, hard rules of law . . . make[s] drafts upon
the heart and nerves which no man can appreciate who has not been obliged to
meet the situation himself . . . .
...
These are burning and difficult questions with which the courts cannot
92
deal . . . .

Judge, employer, and employee would find relief in workers’ compensation
statutes.
In the opening years of the twentieth century, states began to pass workers’
compensation statutes, creating a domino effect as employers and legislators
on a state by state basis determined it was better to indemnify injured workers
with set schedules, caps, and insurance, than to constantly risk a showdown in
court where damages could vary wildly.93 Between 1911 and 1948, all fifty
states passed some form of workers’ compensation statutes, reducing the flood
of litigation by giving employers fixed liability for an employee’s injury,
provided the injury qualified.94
Despite these advancements, there are substantial critics of the system who
find workers’ compensation to be codified oppression of the worker.95 The
main contention is that by waiving the right to bring suit, the worker loses a
fundamental right of recovery and leaves his or her fate to a set schedule of
fees, damages, and medical care, all of which can be highly suspect depending
on the state system.96 Some common problems are that fee schedules are too
89. Id. at 66 (citing WALTER F. DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION
23–24 (1936)).
90. Id. at 66, 70 (listing defenses including assumption of risk and contributory negligence).
91. See id. at 66–67.
92. Id. at 67 (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Driscoll v. Allis-Chalmers Co.,
129 N.W. 401, 408–09 (Wis. 1911)).
93. Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 79, at 70–71.
94. Id.
95. See Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ Compensation
“Reform”, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 679–80 (1998).
96. See Eston W. Orr, Jr., Note, The Bargain Is No Longer Equal: State Legislative Efforts
to Reduce Workers’ Compensation Costs Have Impermissibly Shifted the Balance of the Quid Pro
Quo in Favor of Employers, 37 GA. L. REV. 325, 351–52, 356–57 (2002) (arguing that some
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abstract—while someone who lost an arm might be unable to find work and
needs substantial assistance, he is considered only proportionally disabled
according to the schedules and, thus, is expected to expediently find work.97
Another issue relates to new injuries or ongoing medical treatments that fall
beyond the scope of the statutory framework or employer-insurance
agreement.98 Finally, many employers still contest the injuries as being selfimposed or falling beyond the scope of recovery, thereby leaving the injured
worker to the clutches of the workers’ compensation appeal process.99 This
process starts with administrative judges and, upon subsequent appeals, finds
itself finally in the state court system, which can be a long and arduous process
for an injured worker simply trying to get some medical assistance.100
Despite the criticisms and disadvantages of the workers’ compensation
system, it remains in full force and provides policy incentives for workplace
safety and employee protection. Since it is a state-based system of rights, each
state’s definition of an “employee” becomes highly significant to recovery for
illegal aliens.101 Courts have recognized the ability for an illegal alien to
recover when they have been injured on the job, irrespective of immigration
policies.102 The ability for state courts to hold state-based employers
accountable for workplace injuries is of substantial concern and public
policy.103
II. LABYRINTHS AND LOOPHOLES: THE CASE LAW PRIOR TO HOFFMAN
PLASTIC
In deciding Hoffman Plastic, the Supreme Court was attempting to resolve
more a decade of conflict involving immigration legislation, labor boards, and
undocumented workers.104 Among many others, four primary cases set the
states altered the balance crucial to workers’ compensation altered by raising their compensability
standards, lowering disability payments, limiting medical benefits, restricting litigation costs, and
expanding employer immunity).
97. Cf. Ellen Smith Pryor, Compensation and a Consequential Model of Loss, 64 TUL. L.
REV. 783, 818–20 (1990).
98. See McCluskey, supra note 95, at 681 (providing carpal tunnel syndrome and back
sprain as examples).
99. See Edwin L. Felter, Jr. & Sarah A. Hubbard, Erosion of the Exclusive Remedy in
Workers’ Compensation, COLO. LAW., Dec. 2002, at 83, 84–85.
100. See Linda J. Starr, Current Issues, Injured on the Job: Using Alternative Dispute
Resolution to Improve Workers’ Compensation in Minnesota, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y
487, 491–95 (1997) (describing the procession of workers’ compensation claims in Minnesota).
101. Cf. Correales, supra note 72, at 151–52 (contrasting workers’ compensation claims in
jurisdictions that consider undocumented workers to be employees with those that do not).
102. Presmanes & Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 253; see infra Part IV.
103. Cf. Joan T.A. Gabel et al., The New Relationship Between Injured Worker and
Employer: An Opportunity for Restructuring the System, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 403 (1998).
104. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 142 n.2 (2002).
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stage for Hoffman Plastic: Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB;105 Local 512, Warehouse &
Office Workers’ Union v. NLRB;106 Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB;107 and
NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc.108
In 1984, Justice O’Connor authored a troublesome opinion in Sure-Tan,
Inc. v. NLRB, where the Court stated that the NLRA applied to undocumented
workers.109 In the majority opinion, Justice O’Connor stated the employer
violated the NLRA by reporting workers to INS for unionizing, thereby clearly
establishing a violation of workers’ rights.110 Justice O’Connor affirmed that
since the NLRB is entitled to define who qualifies as a worker, the NLRA’s
definitions are inclusive to undocumented workers.111 The NLRB awarded
reinstatement remedies to the workers, which the Seventh Circuit conditioned
on their legal re-entry to the country.112 The Court affirmed the Board’s award
of reinstatement as valid and binding.113 On the other hand, the Court ruled
that the Court of Appeals exceeded its authority under the NLRA when it
modified the NLRB’s order to include six months back pay for these
undocumented workers.114 Justice O’Connor stated that since under the
NLRA, undocumented workers are not available to work, the remedy was
speculative and thus not sufficiently tailored to the unfair labor practice.115
Conversely, in the very same holding, the Court clearly affirmed that the
NLRA applies to undocumented workers and that there is little conflict
between the INA and NLRA.116 Justice O’Connor stated that effectuating the
NLRA in protecting undocumented workers from discrimination and unfair
working conditions implicitly ensures that legal employees are also protected
at the same worksite.117 In a moment foreshadowing Hoffman Plastic, the
Court stated that holding employers culpable under the NLRA regarding illegal
labor removes a perverse incentive to hire illegal labor; therefore, the

105. 467 U.S. 883, 891–92 (1984) (holding that undocumented aliens are “employees” under
the NLRA).
106. 795 F.2d 705, 719–20 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that illegal workers could collect back
pay under the NLRA).
107. 976 F.2d 1115, 1121–22 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that illegal workers could not collect
back pay under the NLRA).
108. 134 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that illegal workers could collect back pay under
the NLRA).
109. Cf. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892, 902–05 (upholding the tolling of back pay until legal
readmission into the United States).
110. Id. at 894–95.
111. Id. at 891–92.
112. Id. at 889.
113. Id. at 902–03.
114. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 899.
115. Id. at 900–01.
116. Id. at 894.
117. Id. at 892.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2011]

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND HOFFMAN PLASTIC

1225

immigration policies and congressional intent are efficiently fulfilled in this
course.118 This dissonance between the two foundational holdings in Hoffman
Plastic was left unresolved; the Court in Sure-Tan lamented that while the
courts can only work within the confines of each act, the legislature is free to
resolve the issue with more clarity.119 The resounding fear was that without
NLRA protections and union involvement for undocumented workers, “there
would be . . . a subclass of workers without a comparable stake in the
collective goals of their legally resident co-workers, thereby eroding the unity
of all the employees and impeding effective collective bargaining.”120
In 1986, on the eve of Congressional action in passing the IRCA, the Ninth
Circuit in Local 512, Warehouse & Office Workers’ Union v. NLRB declared
that not only were undocumented workers protected by the NLRA, but also
determined that granting them back-pay “does not detract” from immigration
policy goals.121 There, the employer laid off three workers and then refused to
honor a collective bargaining contract.122 The court read Sure-Tan’s holding to
say that it did not govern undocumented workers who remain in the United
States and are not subject to any active deportation process.123 The court
interpreted Sure-Tan to be concerned with illegal border crossing—a view
made possible since the INA was the only federal immigration policy
controlling at the time and did not outlaw the employment of undocumented
workers.124 In fact, the INA did not even make it a crime to be employed after
illegally entering the country; thus, the court found, as long as the workers
remained in the United States and were available to work, they were entitled to
the back pay remedies afforded by the NLRA.125
The first seminal case after the passing of the IRCA, Del Rey Tortilleria,
Inc. v. NLRB, found that Local 512 was misguided in its conclusions and now,
under the IRCA, undocumented workers are not entitled to back pay.126 The
Seventh Circuit held that while the NLRA still considers undocumented
workers as employees, the IRCA disavows any ability to grant back pay since
employment of undocumented labor is now illegal and cannot be
encouraged.127 In a twist of fate, since the unfair labor practice at issue in Del
Rey Tortilleria occurred before the passing of the IRCA, the court relied on

118.
119.
120.
121.
1986).
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 903.
Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 904.
Id. at 892.
Local 512, Warehouse & Office Workers’ Union v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 705, 722 (9th Cir.
Id. at 709.
Id. at 717, 719.
Id. at 719.
Id at 719, 722.
Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1115, 1119–21 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1121.
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Sure-Tan rationale: There cannot be any back pay for undocumented workers
who were not legally available to work.128 The Seventh Circuit concluded by
urging any worker seeking to utilize a reinstatement remedy from the NLRB to
produce documents proving they are legally allowed to work in the United
States.129
The last major case prior to Hoffman Plastic was the 1995 decision NLRB
v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc.,130 in which the pendulum swung back
towards finding justification to award undocumented workers back pay. The
NLRB found that the NLRA and IRCA are not competing policies, but in fact
“must be read in harmony as complementary elements of a legislative scheme
explicitly intended, in both cases, to protect the rights of employees in the
American workplace.”131 The NLRB found that both acts were established
with similar congressional intent for the workplace, in that both the NLRA and
IRCA are to ensure lawful workers in the American economy are afforded
proper protections both from unfair labor practices and unfair illegal labor
competition.132 The Board assessed the congressional intent in the IRCA and
its emphasis on penalties on employers for hiring workers without proper
documentation, characterizing the threat as “[a] ready supply of individuals
willing to work for substandard wages in unsafe workplaces, with unregulated
hours and no rights of redress, [which] enables the unscrupulous employers
that depend on illegal aliens to turn away Americans and legally working alien
applicants who hesitate to accept the same conditions.”133 The NLRB found
that one way to discourage corrupt employers looking to put both illegal labor
and the American working class at dangerous odds with each other is by
requiring such employers to reinstate and award back pay to undocumented
workers.134 Any other outcome would provide employers with a windfall amid
violations of both NLRA and the IRCA, allowing workplace abuses to
increase, since undocumented workers will not report abuses in fear of
deportation proceedings.135
As the case law and policy pendulum swung back and forth amid these
cases, the Supreme Court had yet to speak to the issue since Sure-Tan. With
the IRCA officially in effect for more than fourteen years, the Hoffman Plastic
decision emerged, establishing a new paradigm of jurisprudence on labor,
immigration, and the fate of the undocumented worker.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 1120–21.
Id. at 1123.
A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Grp., Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408 (1995).
Id. at 408.
See id. at 414–15.
Id. at 414.
See id.
A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Grp., 320 N.L.R.B. at 414.
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III. HOFFMAN PLASTIC COMPOUNDS, INC. V. NLRB
A.

Background to Hoffman Plastic Compounds

The factual and procedural background underlying Hoffman Plastic
created a perfect policy paradox that was doomed to be inherited by the
Supreme Court. In May 1988, Hoffman Plastic hired Jose Castro and seven
months later fired him due to AFL-CIO union organizing activities at its
plant.136 The NLRB found the termination of Mr. Castro to be in direct
violation of § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, under which an employer terminating an
employee in regards to his union activities is illegal.137 The remedies awarded
by the NLRB were reinstatement and back pay, thus requiring an
administrative hearing to determine the amount of back pay.138 At this
hearing, Mr. Castro admitted that he was not a legal citizen of the United
States and that he had provided false documentation to Hoffman when
obtaining employment.139 The administrative law judge (ALJ) held that both
back pay and reinstatement were precluded by Sure-Tan and federal
immigration law (IRCA).140 The NLRB reversed the ALJ’s finding and held
that back pay was the best way to effectuate immigration policies, thereby
curbing employers from being shielded by the IRCA for direct NLRA
violations.141 Hoffman Plastic appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia; the petition was denied, affirming the NLRB’s finding for back
pay for Mr. Castro.142 In the midst of the swirling case law of Sure-Tan,
APRA, and two major congressional statutes at odds with each other (IRCA
and NLRA), the Supreme Court granted certiorari.143 The 5-4 decision was the
result of a tense struggle, evidenced by the divergent rationales of the majority
and dissent; each side concluded that their position resolved the crisis while
asserting the other encouraged more immigration policy mischief.144

136. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002).
137. Id. (citing 306 N.L.R.B. 100 (1992); National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a)(3), 49 Stat.
449, 452 (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2006)).
138. Id. at 140–41.
139. Id. at 141.
140. Id.
141. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 141.
142. Id. at 142.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 151–52; id. at 155–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Holding and Analysis of the Hoffman Plastic Majority

The majority opinion reversed the NLRB and D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, holding that the IRCA precludes the NLRB from having power to
award back pay to Mr. Castro.145 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, found support in both Congress’s express intent when passing the
IRCA as well as case law.146
The majority relied upon two prior holdings in which the Supreme Court
had held that the NLRB could not grant back pay due to an employee’s illegal
acts.147 Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed that the NLRB’s remedies are limited
when employees’ actions violate federal statutes.148 Not one to ignore the
elephant in the room, Justice Rehnquist directly asserted that the Supreme
Court holding in Sure-Tan is still binding in that the NLRA applies to
undocumented workers.149
The Court found that their decision in ABF Freight was distinguishable
from the facts of Hoffman Plastic, notwithstanding both cases contained
employees committing illegal acts.150 In ABF Freight, the Court held that an
employee’s false testimony at a compliance proceeding does not by itself
require the NLRB to deny back pay.151 In the Hoffman Plastic opinion, Justice
Rehnquist distinguished ABF Freight based on several factors, including the
fact that federal statutes were not implicated and the fact that the testimony did
not render the entire employment relationship illegal.152 Justice Rehnquist
asserted that unlike ABF Freight, here, all three of those distinctive factors
were implicated when Mr. Castro provided false documents to gain
employment.153 These differences, the Court explained, required that the
Southern S.S. Co. and Fansteel doctrines control when addressing the facts of
Hoffman Plastic.154
145. Id. at 151–52.
146. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 140, 145, 147, 149 (“We find . . . that
awarding back pay to illegal aliens runs counter to policies underlying IRCA, policies the Board
has no authority to enforce or administer.”).
147. Id. at 143 (citing S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 46–47 (1942); NLRB v. Fansteel
Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257–58 (1939)). In both cases cited, the Supreme Court had
held that serious illegal conduct, such as the violent seizing of property (Fansteel) and inciting a
mutiny (S. S.S. Co.), foreclosed the NLRB from being able to award back pay. Id. at 143–44
(citing S. S.S. Co., 316 U.S. 46–47; Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 at 257–58).
148. Id. at 144.
149. Id. at 144, 147–48 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006)). This assertion came despite the fact
that the IRCA criminalized the actions underlying the Sure-Tan decision. Cf. id.
150. Id. at 145–46.
151. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 145.
152. Id. at 146.
153. See id.
154. Id.
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The majority’s main conclusion was that Congress’s intent in passing the
IRCA’ was to curb illegal immigration by making it a crime to provide false
documents to gain employment in the United States.155 The preliminary action
by Mr. Castro, providing false documents, violated the IRCA; therefore, any
latter violation of the NLRA would be a consequence of the original action—a
violation of immigration law.156 Justice Rehnquist stated that to award back
pay to an undocumented worker who previously violated federal law “not only
trivializes the immigration laws, it also condones and encourages future
violations.”157 Bolstering his position, Justice Rehnquist explained that
typically, workers must mitigate damages by searching for employment while
their case is pending,158 which in this case, would require Mr. Castro to further
violate the IRCA by once again providing false documents to gain mitigating
employment.159 The Court explained that Hoffman was not getting a windfall;
the company was issued a cease and desist order and was directed to post
notice to employees of their rights under the NLRA.160 In issuing this
decision, the majority ended the era of the INA, Sure-Tan, and allowing NLRB
to effectuate back pay remedies for undocumented workers.161 The Court
stated that the policy paradox is solved by squarely enforcing IRCA penalties
over NLRA remedies when they pertain to illegal immigration and back pay of
undocumented workers.162
C. Dissenting from the “Wink and Nod”
The four dissenting justices (Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg)
concluded in their opinion that there is no conflict of immigration and labor
policies and that awarding back pay is both within the scope of power for the
NLRB as well as in accord with immigration policies.163 The dissenting
opinion, authored by Breyer, based its position on: 1) the importance of NLRA
remedies; 2) the perverse incentives created by superseding IRCA over NLRA;
3) distinguishing the majority’s case law; and 4) deferring to administrative
agencies.164
The dissent argued that the importance of the NLRA—specifically the
back pay remedy afforded by the NLRB—is evidenced by over thirty years of

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See id. at 147–48.
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 141, 148–49.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 150–51 (citing Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 901 (1984)).
Id. at 150–51.
Id. at 152.
Cf. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 147–53.
Cf. id. at 151–52.
Id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 153–61.
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case law,165 spanning from Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB166 to A.P.R.A
Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc.167 Justice Breyer found the remedy necessary to
combat illegal conduct and protect both employees and the market economy
from mischievous employers wanting to violate the NLRA.168 The majority,
Justice Breyer argued, erroneously believed that awarding back pay
encourages violations, but socioeconomics is what drives migrants to illegally
enter the country.169 Thus, by removing penalties on employers, the majority
created a “perverse economic incentive” to hire undocumented workers.170
Therefore, what the majority has done actually creates a “wink and nod” black
market labor economy where the very purpose behind the IRCA—the curbing
of illegal hiring and illegal entry into the United States—is undermined by
only slapping employers lightly on the wrists.171
Justice Breyer also found the majority’s statutory analysis of the IRCA to
be weak and unsupported, since nowhere in the IRCA does Congress speak to
how providing false documents affects other agencies’ awards, remedies, or
powers.172 Furthermore, the dissent illustrates that the IRCA and the very
provisions upon which the majority bases its opinion are all intended to
effectuate labor policies.173 Therefore, curbing illegal immigration would be
best effectuated by deferring to the NLRB, rather than to the IRCA.174 In
addition, the dissent noted that the Attorney General and other governmental
agencies empowered to enforce immigration law fully supported the NLRB’s
decision to award back pay.175 The dissent finally argued that there is no real
tension between the NLRA and IRCA: the IRCA penalizes Mr. Castro for his
providing of false documents,176 and the NLRA penalizes Hoffman for
violating the NLRA.177 Thus, the immigration policy purpose argument made
by the majority seems to fall apart upon a contextual glance.
Justice Breyer next found that the majority’s endorsement of the Southern
Steamship Co. and Fansteel decisions was misguided and Hoffman Plastic’s
facts are more analogous to ABF Freight.178 Here, the dissent states, Mr.
165. See id. at 154.
166. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 154 (citing Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB,
414 U.S. 168, 185 (1973)).
167. Id. (citing A.P.R.A Fuel Oil Buyers Grp., Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408, 415 n.38 (1995)).
168. Id.
169. Cf. id. at 155.
170. Id.
171. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 155–56.
172. Id. at 154–55.
173. Id. at 156–57.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 158.
176. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 154–55.
177. Id. at 155–56.
178. Id. at 157–58.
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Castro was fired entirely without cause, while in both Southern Steamship Co.
and Fansteel, the employees—in addition to their unionization activities—had
committed independent criminal acts which made their termination proper.179
The Hoffman Plastic dissent felt that Justice Rehnquist’s argument that an
aggressive seizure of property and mutiny are somehow analogous to a worker
fired for unionizing and later found to be undocumented was misplaced.180 In
ABF Freight, committing perjury did not preclude NLRA remedies, the dissent
noted, and further, in that very case the Court explained that the NLRB has
“broad discretion” to resolve a labor law violation with back pay despite civil
or criminal infractions.181 Thus, the dissent articulated, the controlling line of
case law should have been ABF Freight, not case law based on mutinies and
violent property seizure.182
Finally, the dissent argued that even if its finding that there was no policy
tension between the IRCA and NLRA and that the NLRB is therefore
empowered to award back pay was erroneous, Chevron’s deference-toreasonable-agency-decisions doctrine should apply.183 In Chevron, the Court
held that if an administrative statute is ambiguous, then courts should grant a
deference to reasonable interpretation by the administering agency.184 Here,
the dissent argued that the NLRB carefully considered the immigration and
labor policy consequences, the Attorney General supported the Board’s
findings, and the finding was reasonable, and thus, the NLRB’s findings
should control on a matter within its authoritative scope.185 The dissent
concluded that not only is there no conflict of laws here, but the majority’s
usurping of enforcing labor law will actually defeat the purpose of the IRCA,
dilute the power of the NLRA, and increase the flow of illegal immigration as
a perverse economic loophole is now created.186
D. Hoffman Plastic in its Own Backyard (NLRB Violations) 2002–2009
The Hoffman Plastic decision has generated a large amount of scholarship,
as well as stirring up controversy amongst Latino advocates. Many of these
advocates believe that Hoffman Plastic has created a license to exploit;187 this

179. Id. at 158–59.
180. Id.
181. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 157.
182. See id. 157–59.
183. Id. at 160–61 (citing Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842–43 (1984)).
184. Chevron USA, Inc., 467 U.S. at 842–43.
185. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 160–61.
186. Id. at 155–56.
187. See, e.g., Correales, supra note 72; Dennise A. Calderon-Barrera, Note, Hoffman v.
NLRB: Leaving Undocumented Workers Unprotected Under United States Labor Laws?, 6
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 119 (2003); Mohar Ray, Comment, Undocumented Asian American
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contention has been made true by the increasingly novel ways employers have
employed Hoffman Plastic in litigation.188 More than academics and interest
groups have commented on Hoffman Plastic. Among other governmental
agencies giving a skeptical glance at the efficiency of the Hoffman Plastic
decision for both labor and immigration law,189 the GAO office estimated that
Hoffman Plastic will have adversely affected over 5.5 million workers.190 In
short, while employers rejoiced, there arose a growing fear that the Hoffman
Plastic precedent would be stretched to preclude other remedies to
undocumented workers including Title VII, the Civil Rights Act, and Family
and Medical Leave Act claims.191 Many of these areas are still unexplored or
left with limited state lower court opinions, thus leaving it unresolved whether
Only the Ninth Circuit has
Hoffman Plastic forecloses recovery.192
distinguished the NLRA from Title VII, holding that undocumented workers
are not precluded from recovery.193 These inconsistent results have led many
government agencies in “refus[ing] to expand Hoffman beyond back pay.”194
Overall, the trend is for courts to hold that while back pay from a knowing
violator of the IRCA is not within the NLRB’s power by Hoffman Plastic, the
Workers and State Wage Laws in the Aftermath of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 13 ASIAN AM.
L.J. 91 (2006).
188. Leticia M. Saucedo, National Origin, Immigrants, and the Workplace: The Employment
Cases in Latinos and the Law and the Advocates’ Perspective, 12 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 53, 65–
66 (2009) (describing employers’ attempts to extend Hoffman Plastic Compounds to the Fair
Labor Standards Act, Title VII, and various state laws).
189. Jill Borak, A Wink and a Nod: The Hoffman Case and Its Effects on Freedom of
Association for Undocumented Workers, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Spring 2003, at 20, 21 (noting the
Attorney General’s Office supported the dissent).
190. Kati L. Griffith, U.S. Migrant Worker Law: The Interstices of Immigration Law and
Labor and Employment Law, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 125, 144 (2009) (citing U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-835, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS: INFORMATION ON THE
NUMBER OF WORKERS WITH AND WITHOUT BARGAINING RIGHTS 18 (2002)).
191. Lilah S. Rosenblum, Mistakes in the Making: The Failure of U.S. Immigration Reform to
Protect the Labor Rights of Undocumented Workers, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Spring 2006, at 23, 23.
192. Cf. id. at 23–24 & 27 n.12 (citing Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy Inc., 658 N.W.2d 510 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2003) (declaring Michigan citizens’ right to wage-loss benefits ends when the employer
discovers they are unauthorized to work); cf. also Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994
(N.H. 2005) (holding an undocumented worker seeking tort remedies could only recover lost
wages at the wage rate of his country of origin, unless he could prove his employer knew about
his undocumented status at the time of hiring).
193. See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S.
905 (2005); see also Christopher Ho & Jennifer C. Chang, Drawing the Line After Hoffman
Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Strategies for Protecting Undocumented Workers in the Title
VII Context and Beyond, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J., 473, 501 (2005) (discussing Rivera).
194. Raquel Aldana, On Rights, Federal Citizenship, and the “Alien”, 46 WASHBURN L.J.
263, 271 (2007) (citing Connie de la Vega & Conchita Lozano-Batista, Advocates Should Use
Applicable International Standards to Address Violations of Undocumented Workers’ Rights in
the United States, 3 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 35, 49–50 (2005)).
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other avenues of recovery has not been foreclosed; this implies that the policy
tension has not been resolved as both illegal immigration and substantial labor
abuses are still prevalent in the United States. Nowhere has the battleground
of litigation been more reactive and powerful as in the realm of workers’
compensation, where Hoffman has been applied with staggering results.
IV. HOFFMAN PLASTIC’S APPLICATION TO WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CASES
A.

Hoffman Plastic Applied in Workers’ Compensation Cases

Hoffman Plastic involved two competing federal laws, the NLRA and
IRCA, each with a respective policy focus on labor and immigration; wherein
the Supreme Court concluded that emphasizing the IRCA over the NLRA best
resolves these national problems.195 Workers’ compensation cases, on the
other hand, involve plaintiffs alleging under state law and workers’
compensation frameworks that they were employees injured on the job and,
therefore, should be able to recover against their employer regardless of their
undocumented status.196 The employers’ defenses to and litigation strategy
regarding these workers’ compensation suits have commonly attempted to
import Hoffman Plastic’s holding to prevent undocumented workers from
recovering any remedies.197 This action by employers has now levied the
IRCA federal law against state workers’ compensation laws, creating a
firestorm of litigation that has led courts to weigh federal preemption against
state police powers.198 The responses vary by state due to each one having a
slightly varied definition of “employee” and differing policy positions on
workers’ compensation; some courts have found (like the dissent in Hoffman
Plastic) that there is no conflict199 while others have held the criminal acts of
providing false documentation to preclude recovery.200
B.

Courts’ Responses to Application of Hoffman Plastic in Workers’
Compensation Cases

The use of federal preemption as a bar to claims of undocumented workers
in workers’ compensation cases via Hoffman Plastic is increasing and yet is
being met with only limited success.201 Preemption is an operation of
congressional intent. “Congress may express its intent to preempt state law:
‘(1) by expressly defining the extent of preemption; (2) by regulating an area

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151–52 (2002).
Presmanes & Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 248–49.
Id. at 250.
See id. at 252–54.
Id. at 248–49, 251.
Id. at 251–52, 254.
Presmanes & Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 251.
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so pervasively that an intent to preempt the entire field may be inferred; and
(3) by enacting a law that directly conflicts with state law.’”202 There have
been a variety of responses by courts across the country to cases involving
workers’ compensation and Hoffman Plastic and two major trends have
emerged: opinions employing and rejecting a preemption analysis203 and
opinions employing a police power policy analysis.204 In both of these
categories a majority of state courts have found that Hoffman Plastic is
misplaced and not applicable to workers’ compensation cases.
1.

Category I: The IRCA & Hoffman Plastic Do Not Preempt States
From Both Enacting Workers’ Compensation Systems that Include
Undocumented Workers and Allow Recovery

Many states have found that Congress intended neither express nor field
preemption in the IRCA to disavow undocumented workers from being
protected by workers’ compensation state statutes.205 These include Florida,206
Georgia,207 Minnesota,208 and Pennsylvania.209
Relying upon statutory construction and Minnesota workers’ compensation
statutes against the purpose behind the IRCA, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held, in Correa v. Waymouth Farms, Inc., that not only is there no preemption
but there is truly no conflict.210 The court in Correa held that the Minnesota
workers’ compensation statute defines employees as “any person who
performs services for another for hire including . . . an alien,”211 thus making
no distinction between documented/authorized and undocumented/
unauthorized workers. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that “[t]he IRCA is
not aimed at impairing existing state labor protections,” and thus, there was no
federal preemption.212

202. Wet Walls, Inc. v. Ledezma, 598 S.E.2d 60, 63 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Ga. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n v. CSX Transp., Inc., 484 S.E.2d 799, 801 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)).
203. See id. at 63 & n.8 (citing Correa v. Waymouth Farms, Inc., 664 N.W.2d 324, 329
(Minn. 2003); Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Astudillo), 810 A.2d 99,
105–06, 108–09 (Pa. 2002)).
204. See, e.g., Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 2006);
Balbuena v. IDR Realty, Inc., 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1258 (N.Y. 2006); Amoah v. Mallah Mgmt.,
LLC, 866 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
205. Presmanes & Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 248–49.
206. Safeharbor Emp’r Servs. I, Inc. v. Cinto Velazquez, 860 So. 2d 984, 986 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2003).
207. Wet Walls, 598 S.E.2d at 63.
208. Correa, 664 N.W.2d at 329, 331.
209. Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Astudillo), 810 A.2d 99, 105–06,
108–09 (Pa. 2002).
210. See Correa, 664 N.W.2d at 329.
211. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 176.011 subdiv. 9 (2002)).
212. Id.
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Furthermore, the Minnesota legislature had impliedly addressed the issue
by including aliens in their workers’ compensation statutes; thus, by the will of
the people, recovery was not precluded by Hoffman Plastic.213 The Minnesota
Supreme Court concluded that, due to Minnesota’s labor statutes and the lack
of federal preemption in the IRCA, the employer’s reliance upon Hoffman
Plastic was misplaced; until the legislature acted otherwise, undocumented
workers were entitled to recover in Minnesota.214
In Safeharbor Employer Services I, Inc. v. Cinto Velazquez, a case of first
impression of applying Hoffman Plastic to workers’ compensation in Florida
courts, the Florida appellate court affirmed the lower court’s ruling for the
undocumented worker on a workers’ compensation claim.215 This court,
relying on Correa and its own workers’ compensation statutes, found that the
IRCA did not preempt state law.216 In finding no federal field preemption, the
court relied upon the Supreme Court’s determination that workers’
compensation is an area of state police power and that Congress had not
occupied the field,217 thus leaving Florida and its legislature free to enact
workers’ compensation statutes that are inclusive to undocumented workers.218
The Georgia Court of Appeals likewise found no federal preemption in
Wet Walls v. Ledezma, which evaluated the workers’ compensation claim of a
disabled and deported worker.219 The employer presented an affirmative
defense, employing Hoffman Plastic as evidencing federal preemption
doctrine, but the Georgia court found the argument unpersuasive; it held that
there is no express or field preemption in the IRCA and no preclusion resulting
from the Hoffman Plastic decision.220 Georgia’s Court of Appeals reaffirmed
its position months later by issuing their decision in Continental Pet
Technologies, Inc. v. Palacias, which allowed a worker to obtain benefits
despite his status under the IRCA as undocumented.221 Thus, across the

213. Id.
214. Id. at 331. Compare this result with Reinforced Earth Co. There, an employer of an
injured undocumented worker claimed federal preemption and raised a public policy argument
about escaped prisoners. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an escaped prisoner is not
analogous to an undocumented worker, and thus, such workers are not precluded from benefits
due to public policy. Reinforced Earth Co., 810 A.2d at 103–05. The majority in Reinforced
Earth did not address preemption despite the encouragement from two dissenting justices. Cf. id.
at 111 (Newman, J., dissenting).
215. Safeharbor Emp’r Servs. I, Inc. v. Cinto Velazquez, 860 So. 2d 984, 985 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2003).
216. Id. at 985–86.
217. Id. at 986 (citing De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976).
218. Id.
219. Wet Walls, Inc. v. Ledezma, 598 S.E.2d 60, 62 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
220. Id. at 63.
221. Cont’l Pet Techs., Inc. v. Palacias, 604 S.E.2d 627, 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
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country, state courts have concluded that the IRCA does not preempt recovery
for undocumented employees under state workers’ compensation statutes.
There are states that have swung the other way, as in Sanchez v. Eagle
Alloy, Inc., in which a Michigan court reversed the lower courts holding that
undocumented workers were allowed recovery.222 This Michigan court
analogized to the Hoffman majority’s rationale that an undocumented worker
providing false work authorization documents committed a crime and is barred
from recovering under Michigan workers’ compensation statutes; thus, on state
statutory application alone, the worker was precluded from protection.223 The
court did hold, however, that while being undocumented precluded wage loss
benefits, it did not preclude making the employer liable for plaintiff’s medical
treatment expenses related to the work injury, for which the court held the
employer responsible.224 Along with Sanchez, there have been courts in other
states that have applied Hoffman Plastic’s rationale in workers’ compensation
cases, finding that the criminal act of providing false documents does, in fact,
remove the worker from statutory inclusion where illegal conduct bars
recovery; however, none of these cases have pulled upon the language of
Congressional preemption.225 While these courts are in the minority, it is
illustrative that there remain trends across the country that leave a potential
litigant—both employer and undocumented immigrant—unable to clearly
predict results of a workers’ compensation claim.
2.

Category II: Hoffman Plastic Has no Application and No Policy Basis
in Workers’ Compensation Cases

While the aforementioned state courts have focused on the absence of
preemption to allow undocumented workers to recover workers’ compensation,
New York has not only found no preemption but consistently finds Hoffman
Plastic toxically misplaced in workers’ compensation and tort claims.226 The
New York cases tend to incorporate the Hoffman Plastic dissent in maintaining
that there is no conflict between labor and immigration policies, and even if
there were, properly effectuated labor laws are the solution to immigration

222. Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy Inc., 658 N.W.2d 510, 512 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
223. Id. at 518, 520.
224. Id. at 518 n.6.
225. See, e.g., Martines v. Worley & Sons Constr., 628 S.E.2d 113, 114 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)
(holding benefits precluded where worker lacked documentation to assume new light-duty job
after injury); Doe v. Kan. Dep’t of Human Res., 90 P.3d 940, 947–48 (Kan. 2004).
226. See Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 2006);
Balbuena v. IDR Realty, LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1257 (N.Y. 2006); Amoah v. Mallah Mgmt.,
LLC, 866 N.Y.S.2d 797, 801 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008); Cano v. Mallory Mgmt. 760 N.Y.S.2d 816,
817 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
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problems—not the inverted answer Rehnquist gave in Hoffman Plastic by
allowing the IRCA to preempt NLRA penalties.227
New York courts captured the dissent from Hoffman Plastic in the Cano v.
Mallory Management decision, where the New York Supreme Court, in ruling
that an undocumented worker was not precluded from recovering for tortious
conduct of the employer, stated “[i]t is also interesting to note that every case
citing Hoffman [Plastic] since it was rendered has either distinguished itself
from it or has limited it greatly.”228 The Cano Court foreshadowed a line of
New York workers’ compensation cases where courts would decline
employers’ usage of Hoffman Plastic on grounds of strong public policy and
state-based safety considerations. Cano distinguished Hoffman Plastic’s facts
from a negligence case about an undocumented employee sustaining severe
injuries from electrocution while working.229 The court authoritatively found
the workers’ status to be irrelevant to the tort claim and stated, “[i]t is contrary
to the public policy of New York State that a person who claims to be injured
as a result of tortious conduct may be barred from pursuing that claim in the
courts of this State based upon the resident status of the claimant.”230
Responding to the employers’ use of Hoffman Plastic to defend against the
negligence suit, the court concluded: “Defendants can not [sic] negligently
injure someone who is within this state legally or not, and then not be
responsible to that injured person for the injuries sustained.”231 Already in
2003, just one year after Hoffman Plastic, the New York courts made it clear
that employers violating labor laws will not evade responsibility simply
because the petitioner is undocumented.232 The workers’ compensation cases
following Cano reaffirmed the New York court’s rationale.
In Balbuena v. IDR Realty, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that
the best way to serve the purpose of the IRCA and curb the employment of
illegal labor would be to punish employers who hire illegal labor and create
The court analyzed each
unsafe working environments for them.233
preemption claim brought by the employer in turn. In regards to express
preemption, the court found the IRCA only preempted civil or criminal
sanctions on undocumented workers, and since workers’ compensation is not a
punishment but rather a compensation to the injured worker, Congress did not
The preemption
expressly preempt workers’ compensation claims.234
227.
817.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

See Balbuena, 845 N.E.2d at 1257; Amoah, 866 N.Y.S.2d at 801; Cano, 760 N.Y.S.2d at
Cano, 760 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
Id. at 816–17.
Id. at 817.
Id.
Cf. id.
Balbuena v. IDR Realty, LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1254, 1259 (N.Y. 2006).
Id. at 1255–56.
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argument likewise fell on deaf ears; the court felt that Congress evinced no
intention to disrupt state regulation of occupational safety and health.235 The
court finally found no conflict preemption, holding that while the federal
government is in exclusive control of immigration law, the states historically
have police power to ensure workplace safety; moreover, statutes to ensure
workplace safety compliance for all state residents were not in conflict with
the federal government’s attempts to curb illegal immigration.236 The court
embraced the policy behind the Hoffman Plastic dissent, noting that limiting
undocumented workers’ recovery gives employers incentive to not comply
with labor laws which places both undocumented and lawful residents at risk,
endangering the entire state.237 Far worse, the court continued, preemption
would reward employers for not complying with the IRCA, since the worker
whose claim would be denied had been employed without ever once being
asked for proper IRCA-required documentation.238 The court stated that
allowing Hoffman Plastic into workers’ compensation lends itself to a
miscarriage of justice, since this usage of Hoffman Plastic defies the purpose
of the IRCA by expressly encouraging illegal immigration and the hiring of
undocumented workers.239 The court proposed a solution to the federal and
state tensions by suggesting that plaintiff’s undocumented status could be one
of many factors the jury considers in its deliberations, but the status cannot
foreclose recovery nor should it be the sole factor to limit damages.240
The Second Circuit, following the New York state court’s lead, held in
Madeira v. Affordable Housing Foundation, Inc. that New York compensation
laws were established to protect workers, they were not preempted, and that
precluding recovery would encourage employers to create hazardous
In this case, an
workplaces for all residents—legal and illegal.241
undocumented worker was injured and brought a workers’ compensation suit
against his employer in federal court for violating a New York scaffolding
safety law.242 The district court found for the worker, and the Second Circuit
affirmed, after analyzing federal and state law as well as public policy
regarding why disallowing recovery would establish a dangerous incentive for
further illegal immigration, workplace safety violations, and exploitation of
undocumented workers.243

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 1256.
Id. at 1256–58.
Id. at 1257–58.
Balbuena, 845 N.E.2d at 1258.
Id. at 1260.
Id. at 1259.
Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 227–29 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 224.
See id. at 248, 254.
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The court explained that while the worker entering the country
undocumented concerns the federal government, there still exists a workplace
safety duty between the worker and his employer according to New York
law.244 Thus, like the dissent in Hoffman Plastic, the Second Circuit found the
issues to be distinct and, here, found the labor safety laws of New York
weighed in favor of a worker’s ability—regardless of residency status—to be
able to effectuate safety statutes by bringing suit when injured.245 Borrowing
reasoning from Balbuena, the Second Circuit found the nature of personal
injury compensation to be unrelated to the IRCA’s sanctions, as the employer,
not the employee, had violated the law.246 Nor had Congress evinced an intent
to eradicate the traditional province of the states over employment
compensation.247 Thus, field and express preemption were found to be
inapplicable and could not stop recovery under New York law.248 Regarding
conflict preemption, the Second Circuit stated that mere tension alone does not
establish conflict preemption, especially when the area of law involves
traditional police powers such as workers’ compensation.249 The Second
Circuit, in finding no conflict, determined that it is possible to effectuate state
workers’ compensation laws while still adhering to federal law.250
The Second Circuit also explored the purpose behind both the IRCA and
the New York workers’ compensation laws, finding the former unrelated to the
claim and the latter essential to allow recovery.251 The New York workplace
safety laws were created to provide “a swift and sure source of benefits to the
injured employee,”252 and New York courts had found the status of a worker to
be irrelevant to the ability to recover.253 This finding was particularly
important since New York historically has been a beacon for immigrant
employment and has a strong affinity for working immigrants.254 Thus, while
the IRCA did criminalize some behaviors, the workplace safety and recovery
for workers remained in force.255 In addition, New York law differed from
other states’ in that New York imposes absolute liability on worksites where

244. Id. at 242.
245. Id.
246. Madeira, 469 F.3d at 239–40 (citing Balbuena v. IDR Realty, LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246,
1255–56 (N.Y. 2006)).
247. Id. at 240–41.
248. Id. at 238–41.
249. See id. at 241.
250. See id. at 242.
251. Madeira, 469 F.3d at 242.
252. Id. at 229 (quoting O’Rourke v. Long, 359 N.E.2d 1347, 1350 (1976)).
253. Id. at 229 & n.10 (citing O’Rourke, 359 N.E.2d at 1351).
254. Immigration City, N.Y. SUN (Apr. 3, 2006), http://www.nysun.com/editorials/immigra
tion-city/30243.
255. Madeira, 469 F.3d at 242.
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general contractors fail to provide safe workplaces—even after Hoffman
Plastic—and expressly extended such protections to undocumented workers.256
The court did recognize that New York courts allow a jury to consider that lost
earnings may be limited by deportation, as held in Balbuena, but reiterated that
the employee’s undocumented status cannot alone bar suit.257
Seemingly anticipating criticism from other courts, the Second Circuit
directly addressed policy concerns of promoting proper incentives and curbing
illegal immigration by exploring the purpose behind the IRCA.258 The Second
Circuit argued that the focus of Congress was to punish employers who
incentivized illegal immigration and not to punish the worker who was simply
responding to employers’ pull.259 The court noted that the sanctions are
harsher on employers who, in patterned conduct, prey on undocumented
workers260 and, thereby, create an underpaid, overworked slave-class and
dangerous work labor environments; whereas, the only penalties on workers
apply to knowing violators who willfully provide false documents.261
Finally, the court illustrated how Hoffman Plastic is both factually and
legally distinguishable from a workers’ compensation case.262 In Hoffman
Plastic, the employee deceived the employer into illegally employment, but
here, the employer knowingly violated the IRCA by hiring an employee
without any documentation.263 In terms of law, Hoffman Plastic involved two
competing federal laws (NLRA, IRCA), and here, the employer was importing
the IRCA into an otherwise simple state law claim involving workers’
compensation.264 The Second Circuit recognized the growing nationwide trend
of employers citing Hoffman Plastic to avoid compensating injured employees
strictly on the basis of their immigration status—despite many state courts
refusing to allow windfalls for such employers.265 The court further stated that
while the Supreme Court may have thought in Hoffman Plastic that allowing
the IRCA to supersede the NLRA was the best policy, here in New York, the
residents’ lives would be placed at risk by extending that holding to workers’
compensation cases.266 The Second Circuit, by limiting Hoffman Plastic to its
own facts, supported the finding that workers’ compensation and illegal

256. Id. at 229.
257. Id. at 225, 228.
258. Id, at 231.
259. Id. at 231 & n.13 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-682(I), at 49 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5653).
260. Madeira, 469 F.3d at 231 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006)).
261. Id. (citing § 1324c).
262. Id. at 236–37.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 237.
265. See Madeira, 469 F.3d at 245 & n.26.
266. See id. at 246.
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immigration can be squared by hitting the strongest and most powerful
economic target, the employers.267 To hold otherwise, the court hinted, would
give credence to the ‘nod and wink’ undocumented labor empires of employers
which encourage unsafe workplaces and worker abuse, and which fan the
flames of illegal immigration—a grotesque outcome not desired by either New
York or, arguably, by the federal government.268
CONCLUSION
Eight years have passed since Hoffman Plastic Compounds, and it remains
a demon haunting the Supreme Court by showing up across the United States
in federal and state courts, while illegal immigration races onward, undeterred
by its holding. While the Hoffman Plastic majority presumed that IRCA’s
precluding NLRA back pay remedies would curb illegal immigration, instead a
perverse usage has emerged. Employers cite Hoffman Plastic preemption as
an affirmative defense, which would allow them to hire undocumented
workers, fire them when they organize for better working conditions, and then
evade liability by denying remedy for someone who happened to be
undocumented. Hoffman Plastic, as critics contend, has in fact led to the
erosion of labor statutes stretching back a century to protect both the resident
and immigrant. Resultantly, the undocumented laborer has few labor rights in
a country built on immigration, equality, and opportunity.
In a more disturbing twist, Hoffman Plastic has crept into workers’
compensation cases, where it threatens not merely back pay, but injured human
beings suffering loss of limbs and excruciating pain sustained while working
for the profit of an employer. These employers attempt to use Hoffman Plastic
to preclude recovery for such injuries—alleging federal preemption of statebased workers’ compensation statutes. The application of Hoffman Plastic in
workers’ compensation would further dehumanize undocumented worker by
not only taking their labor rights but also their human rights.
So far, the response by courts across the country has been to limit Hoffman
Plastic to its facts, with few cases allowing the extension of Hoffman Plastic to
workers’ compensation. The opinions, statutes, and outcomes vary because the
incentives and issues behind illegal immigration, employee rights, and state
police powers fluctuate per jurisdiction. A growing trend evidenced in New
York and the Second Circuit cases is that workplace safety and state police
powers mandate recovery for workers regardless of their citizenship status.
These courts do not support illegal immigration—in fact, quite to the
contrary—they find the best way to curb it is what the Hoffman Plastic dissent
realized: it is the one with the capital, the worksites, and the foremen hiring the

267. Id. at 254.
268. Cf. id. at 235 n.16.
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workers that must be disincentivized; anything else is a band-aid on the already
gangrenous wound of economic exploitation.
Illegal immigration is not a problem that can be deported. Already,
employers disregard the IRCA by actively hiring undocumented workers. To
preclude recovery for workers’ compensation is to encourage these employers
by creating a license to exploit. Furthermore, precluding the workers’ recovery
inflicts collateral damage upon the U.S. economy and legitimately creates a
twenty-first century class of disposable peasant workers. This policy outcome
defies our traditions, our Bill of Rights, and our intent to secure both the
borders and the labor markets. Congress must pass effective and economically
thoughtful legislation to curb illegal immigration. The IRCA is not enough.
The Supreme Court and lower courts must protect the NLRA and workers’
compensation statutes from the perverse and dangerous usage made possible in
Hoffman Plastic. Then, and only then, will the “wink and nod” industries start
to collapse and will Hoffman Plastic’s undocumented box be closed.
OLIVER T. BEATTY
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